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I.  Introduction 
Recent research links the inequality we observe today across former colonies, and even within 
regions in former colonies, to colonial institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; 
Engerman  and  Sokoloff,  1997;  2002;  Bruhn  and  Gallego,  2007).   According to  this  literature 
endowments  and  the  conditions  at  the  time  of  colonization  determined  a  set  of  political 
institutions that ended up perpetuating an unequal distribution of land, wealth, and political 
power.    In  fact,  the  variation  in  colonial  institutions  has  been  identified  as  a  cause  of 
heterogeneity  in  expenditures  on  public  goods  per  capita,  such  as  education,  both  across 
countries (Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloff, 2009; Gallego, 2010) or within countries (Banerjee 
and Iyer, 2005; Iyer, 2010; Wegenast, 2009). 
Yet  much  of  the  literature  on  colonial  institutions  has  focused  on  finding  persistent 
effects using reduced form estimates and very little research has been done to study how some 
countries  or  subnational  units  broke  away  from  their  colonial  past  and  changed  their 
development trajectories.  For instance, we know that in the nineteenth century former colonies 
in  what  is  now  Latin  America  experienced  a  radical  reversal  of  fortune  for  the  worse 
(Acemoglu,  Johnson,  and  Robinson,  2002).  There  is  also  evidence  that  trade  shocks  in  the 
nineteenth century increased inequality within countries in the Americas (Williamson, 2009). 
Still, we do not know much of how trade shocks can actually improve institutions in 
former colonies.  Moreover, as the development literature acknowledges, economic growth and 
development  outcomes  are  a  complex  set  of  interactions  between  policies  and  institutions 
(Rodrik and Rosenzweig, 2010). Thus, we look at the variation over time in the provision of 
public elementary education, holding constant colonial institutions, either through fixed effects 
or by holding constant variables common to all states (e.g., identity of the colonizer, religion, or 
legal origin). By focusing on variation over time, rather than just on path dependence since 
colonial times, our findings contrast with the growing literature on colonial institutions in Brazil 
(Naritomi,  Soares  and  Assunção,  2007;  Wegenast,  2009;  Summerhill,  2010;  de  Carvalho  and 
Colistete, 2010). 
We do not think that looking at path-dependence in our case gives us much mileage 
because if education outcomes were a consequence of colonial institutions more than any of the 
dynamics we show in this paper, we would expect to find that original distribution of human 2 
 
capital across states should not change that much over time. For instance, we would expect to 
find that measures of literacy in 1872 (the year of the first census) were highly correlated with 
measures of literacy in the twentieth century and we would not expect to find radical reversals 
of fortune during our period of study (1889-1930). The evidence we have, however, documents 
a reversal of fortune among states in our period. Literacy rates across states in 1872 are not 
correlated strongly with literacy rates in the second half of the twentieth century, while literacy 
rates after 1900 are highly correlated with literacy rates in 1991 or 2007 (see Table 1).  Our 
evidence,  therefore,  suggests  that  something  altered  the  relative  inequality  among  states 
between  1890  and  1930  that  then  had  persistent  effects  in  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth 
century. 
We show that one of the main drivers of change in relative human capital accumulation 
across  states  between  1891  and  1930  was  the  effect  of  the  commodity  boom  of  the  late 
nineteenth century and the fact that Brazil adopted an extremely decentralized fiscal system in 
the  Constitution  of  1891.  The  Constitution  of  1891  divided  Brazil  into  20  states  with  very 
autonomous spending powers and with the sole right to collect export taxes.  The fact that states 
governments could tax commodity exports allowed the governments of provinces with positive 
shocks in the terms of trade to collect higher revenues per capita and spend more on education. 
In  contrast,  those  states  that  had  negative  shocks  in  their  terms  of  trade  collected  lower 
revenues and lagged behind in terms of expenditures in things like education, infrastructure, 
and police.  
We look at this as a quasi-experiment because Brazil is a country large enough to have 
significant  heterogeneity  in  endowments  and  colonial  institutions  across  provinces  (e.g., 
variation  in  climate,  soil  types,  or  the  extent  to  which  plantation  agriculture  was  used  by 
settlers). Moreover, between 1891 and 1930, The Constitution of 1891 gave states almost total 
autonomy  when  it  came  to  tax  collection,  even  giving  them  the  right  to  tax  exports.  We, 
therefore, feel we can treat states as independent observations given that during this period the 
federal government did not do a significant effort to redistribute among states and immigration 
within the country was minimal.  
Using both OLS and IV techniques (and controlling for a series of macro variables, fixed 
effects, and time dummies) we find that both changes in export tax revenues or simply the 3 
 
change in the terms of trade correlated positively with education expenditures per capita.  We 
also run regressions in which we interact variables that measure colonial institutions (time-
invariant) with our variable of interest, export tax revenue per capita, and find no significant 
correlation with expenditures on education.  
We show that the boom in certain commodities allowed Brazilian states to increase their 
revenues and, in turn, their expenditures on public goods, such as education. Between 1889 and 
1930, and despite bad colonial institutions, Brazil as a whole had the largest increase in literacy 
rates in Latin America, going from 19.8% in 1890 to 40% in 1940 (for the population over 4 years 
of  age).  This  improvement,  however,  was  uneven,  with  some  states  such  as  São  Paulo 
improving their literacy rate from 18.8% to 52%, while others like Maranhão, Mato Grosso, and 
Bahia  kept  their  rate  flat  at  20%  during  the  same  period.  In  that  sense,  Brazil  may  have 
represented  a  second-best  environment  for  education  reform  and  policy  implementation 
(Rodrik, 2008). 
We devote the last section of the paper to study the political economy of education 
expenditures. We follow Lindert (2003, 2004) and show that political voice (the percentage of 
the population who could vote) is correlated with expenditures on education.  Yet, instead of 
looking at a one-way causality, from voters to expenditures, we think that there is possible 
reverse causality. As politicians spent on education, literacy rates increased, and consequently, 
as  only  literate  male  adults  could  vote,  these  increases in literacy led to  an  increase in  the 
number of voters.  We attribute the improvements in the supply of education to the fact that 
during the period 1889 to 1930, the electoral law of Brazil provided incentives for politicians to 
use windfall export tax profits to spend on education, more than on any other ―normal‖ public 
good  (e.g.,  healthcare).  Since  there  was  a  national  literacy  requirement  to  vote  and  state 
politicians had incentives to maximize the number of voters they could mobilize in federal 
elections, increasing literacy rates was necessary to increase the number of voters. 
We  provide  econometric  evidence  that  exhibits  a  positive  correlation  between 
expenditures on education and an increase in the number of voters over time. That means that 
states  with  positive  trade  shocks  were  able  to  spend  more  on  education  and  increased  the 
number of literate males who could vote. This finding is at odds with the idea that in countries 
with literacy requirements political elites have no incentives to increase the supply of public 4 
 
education that can benefit the masses (Engerman, Mariscal and Sokoloff, 2009; Lindert, 2003, 
2004). Yet we find that the expansion of public education benefitted disproportionately white 
Brazilians.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe the changes in education in 
Brazil between independence and 1930.  Section III shows how commodity prices determined 
the changes in expenditures on education and in education indicators. Section IV discusses the 
incentives of political elites to spend on education. Section V concludes by discussing some of 
the long-term implications of education policy between 1889 and 1930. 
II.  The Evolution of Education in Brazil from Independence to 1930 
A newly independent Brazil adopted, in 1821, a constitutional monarchy with a clear division of 
power and centralized taxation. During the imperial period (1821-1889), executive power rested 
with  the  emperor  and  council  of  ministers  and  an  elected  parliament  was  responsible  for 
legislative  tasks.  Parliamentarians  (senators  and  deputies)  were  elected  by  state  electoral 
colleges. Electoral participation was restricted by an income requirement, which was a year’s 
income for most skilled professions.1 Provincial governments were weak and had little control 
over fiscal revenues under this political arrangement, and most of the revenues collected by the 
central government were spent in the capital.  
Despite the centralization of taxation and expenditures,  the members of congress that 
drafted the  Constitution of 1824  chose to decentralize the provision of education. Therefore, 
from 1824 on, the imperial government focused mostly on providing education in the capital of 
the country and subsidizing a couple of universities around the country,  while the provincial 
governments were in charge of elementary and secondary edu cation in their own territories  
(Hilsdorf, 2003). 
                                                 
1 The process was, in fact, even more complex because Brazil had a system of indirect elections. 
That is, voters in parishes (known as eleitores) would vote to elect an electoral college similar to that of the 
United States. The members of this electoral college were known as votantes (voters). The Constitution of 
1824 included income requirements for both, eleitores and votantes. For the former it was 100$ per year 
(or approximately US $60), while the latter needed to prove an income of $200. There were exceptions to 
this requirement, mostly for members of the army. See Porto (2002), pp. 44-45. Law 3029 of January 9, 
1881 increased the income requirement to vote to 200$ for eleitores.  5 
 
The  centralization  of  fiscal  resources  paired  with  the  decentralization  of  education 
yielded poor results. For instance, by the end of the imperial period, in 1889, Brazil was the 
largest country in South America and had one of the lowest literacy rates (16.6%). In some 
Brazilian provinces literacy rates were closer to 10%, with enrollment rates below 10% in most 
states. Finally, there were two schools for every 1,000 school-age children in the country and in 
some states, such as Bahia and Ceará, there was only one school per 1,000 children (see Table 2). 
This  confirms  the  findings  of  Pritchett  and  Woolcock  (2004),  who  argue  that  other  critical 
elements of effective service delivery are information, accountability, and improved delivery 
mechanisms. 
In  1879,  Leôncio  de  Carvalho,  Minster  for  Internal  Affairs,  sent  a  bill  to  reform  the 
education system of the country to Congress that introduced secular education and mandated 
the creation of schools of education to train teachers. Education outcomes improved gradually 
in most states after these reforms, but significant changes in school infrastructure, number of 
teachers, and the curriculum did not take place until after the Republican parties took over state 
governments in the 1890s.  
Education During The Republic (1889–1930): Increases in Literacy in 1-2-3 
In  1889,  a  Republican  movement  that  overthrew  the  emperor  in  a  peaceful  revolution 
established a provisional government in charge of drafting a new constitution.  Through the 
change  in  the  legal  framework  and  the  rise  of  a  new  dominant  ideology  (positivism),  the 
Republican government brought about a major reform in the way schooling was financed and 
organized. 
Among the most important issues the new Constitution of 1891 brought about was the 
decentralization of public finances in Brazil.2 State governments were allowed to tax exports 
and keep all the revenue. This boosted state coffers in states that exported commodities in high 
                                                 
2 In the Constitutional Congress of 1890-91, a coalition of exporter states that included São Paulo, 
Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Pará, and Amazonas defeated a more disorganized coalition that 
included sugar exporting states in the northeast and the cattle-exporting state of Rio Grande do Sul. In 
fact, the bargaining power of the winning coalition stemmed to a large extent from the fact that the 
commodities those states exported, such as coffee and rubber, had significant booms at the end of the 
nineteenth century. Martinez Fritscher (2009) argues that the economic power of the local elites made the 
threat of leaving the federation credible enough to allow them to push for a decentralized constitution. 6 
 
demand  (e.g.,  rubber  and  coffee)  and  eroded  the  public  finances  of  states  that  exported 
commodities with negative price shocks (e.g., sugar, tobacco, or cotton).  Table 3 shows that, 
from the Empire to the Republic, there was an increase in real expenditures on education per 
capita of almost 80% on average, but also show the decline in many states exporting sugar, 
tobacco, and cotton.  
Table 2 shows that the states that had higher average expenditures on education per 
capita between 1889 and 1930, were those that exported rubber, coffee, and cattle. States that 
exported coffee and rubber, for instance, spent more than 2.5 times what sugar-exporting states 
spent per capita (and over 3.5 times what cotton exporters spent). The same differences across 
states is clear when we look at the number of schools per thousand children in Table 2, a figure 
closely correlated with the level of export tax revenues per capita. 
The  education  system  in  Brazil  underwent  a  gradual  transformation  throughout  the 
Republican  period.  First,  ministers  of  the  interior  or  of  education  in  the  states  gradually 
changed the way schools worked. From the Lancaster method in which in one room students 
from all ages studied together and helped each other learn with the guidance of one teacher, 
Republican governments in the states started to modernize schools, introducing the idea of 
having one teacher per subject and one subject at a time in the schedule. These changes required 
changes  in  the  buildings  as  well.  Schools  could  no  longer  consist  of  one  large  room.  They 
required specialization of certain spaces, a separation of students by grades, and the creation of 
spaces like labs, gyms, and libraries. Obviously not all the states could provide all of these 
facilities in all of their schools, but gradually schools in large cities started to converge to the 
new school layout and the new schedule (de Souza, 1998). 
The results of an increase in the fiscal capacity of states to spend in schools and the 
ideological  drive  to  change  the  schooling  system  led  to  significant  improvements  in  school 
enrollments, teacher-pupil ratios, and the number of schools per children enrolled. Enrollment 
rates in elementary school, defined as the number of students enrolled over the population of 
children from 5 to 14 years old, went from 7% in 1889 to 23% in 1933 (Table 2). 
The most important increases in enrollment rates took place as a consequence of the 
expansion  of  public  education  at  the  state  level.  The  elementary  school  system  during  the 
republic  was  divided  into  four:  private,  state,  municipal,  and  federal  schools.  Since 7 
 
independence  in  1821  most  of  the  elites  attended  private  schools;  in most  towns  and  cities 
private  schools  were  perhaps  the  best  providers  of  education.  Yet,  most  of  the  increase  in 
enrollment between 1907 and 1933 took place in schools sponsored by their state governments, 
gaining market share over private schools  
The increase in the number of  teachers is perhaps a better indicator of the speed at 
which state governments invested in education. Table 4 shows the pupil-teacher ratios at the 
state level decreased, as state governments hired enough new teachers to outpace the rapid 
increase  in  enrollment  rates.  In  contrast,  the  pupil-teacher  ratio  in  private,  municipal,  and 
federal schools increased over the same period. 
III.  Data and Methodology 
In order to document the drivers of expenditures on education and of education outcomes, we 
created  a  panel  with  data  on  expenditures  on  education,  export  tax  revenues  per  state, 
population density, and imports per capita between 1890 and 1930. The Appendix explains the 
sources  and  methodology  by  which  the  key  variables  used  in  the  present  analysis  were 
estimated.  Below,  we  explain  how  we  construct  our  main  dependent  variables  and  the 
empirical strategy used to estimate the determinants of public goods expenditures for Brazilian 
states. 
We  start  by  running  a  simple  OLS  regression  using  panel  data.  Our  baseline 
specification for examining the determinants of expenditures on education per capita by state is 
of the following form: 
eeit= β sit + δXit + ζi+φt +εit, 
where eeit is the log of expenditures on education per capita in state i in year t, sit is the log of 
export tax revenue per capita for each state i and year t.  We also include a vector of state 
characteristics, X, which includes imports per capita, and population or population density. 
Most specifications include fixed effects (ζi) to control for state unobservable characteristics and 
year  dummies  (φt)  to  account  for  time  varying  trends  common  to  all  states  (in  some 
specifications we include state trends as well).  
The main coefficient β should be interpreted as an (export) income elasticity for state 
governments that tells us, in percentage points, how much expenditures on education would 
increase  given  a  1%  increase  in  export  tax  revenue.    We  use  the  natural  logarithm  of  the 8 
 
variables to minimize the effect of outliers. Working with natural logs we know most variables 
follow a normal distribution. 
We believe it is important to control for imports per capita because it allow us to control 
for factors that may have determined the demand for education, such as the increase in GDP 
per capita at the state level. This is because imports had a high elasticity of income in Brazil 
during this period. Also, as the average family got richer it was easier to send their kids to 
school. Thus, imports per capita may also help us to control for factors driving the demand for 
education, such as the level of income or industrialization in the state. It may not be the best 
variable to capture all of these effects, but given the data limitations, especially to build a panel, 
we think this variable is the best we can do to control for some of those factors on a year-by-
year basis. 
We understand that even if the type of commodities states could export and the prices of 
those commodities were determined exogenously for each of the states, the amount of state tax 
revenues devoted to education may depend on initial conditions at the state level. For instance, 
politicians  may  spend  less  on  education  per  capita  in  states  with  higher  initial  levels  of 
education or in states in which the there was more inequality in the distribution of assets (e.g., 
land) (Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloff, 2009). Moreover, perhaps in states in which there 
were more slaves before emancipation (1888), elites would want to restrict education for blacks, 
a phenomenon that took place in the south of the United States for decades after the Civil War 
(Margo, 1990). 
We, therefore, have three ways to deal with the initial heterogeneity across states. First, 
we  run  our  OLS  regressions  using  fixed  effects.  Second,  we  run  the  baseline  specification 
adding an interaction terms of our variable of interest sit (the log export tax revenue per capita) 
with different variables that proxy for ―colonial institutions‖ or at least for inequality in the 
distribution of land and wealth that it could come from colonial times. The variables that proxy 
for colonial institutions include the percentage of slaves to total population in 1872, population 
per state before the arrival of the Portuguese, measures of the concentration of land ownership, 
and dummies that capture if the main commodity produced during colonial times in a state 
relied on plantation agriculture and/or slave labor (for precise definitions see Panel C of the 
Appendix). In a way this may be redundant information because export tax revenues per capita 9 
 
were a product of the crop mix of each state, which in turn were a product of endowments, 
previous availability of slaves, and other initial conditions. Still we use these specifications as 
robustness  checks  to  confirm  if  education  expenditures  were  driven  by  the  institutions 
commonly used in the literature.  
Third, it is important to check if we are confounding the effects of positive trade shocks 
with possible state-specific trends that may come from before our period. Moreover, it could 
also be the case that there are state-specific trends that may be correlated with trade shocks, but 
that  were  not  necessarily  a  consequence  of  them.    Therefore,  we  run  our  baseline  OLS 
specifications using only the averages of our variables. We also run the full panel with OLS 
including  state-specific  trends.  The  results  we  get  doing  these  two  specifications  are  very 
similar and have statistical significance of either 1% or 5%. 
Instrumental Variables Approach 
Beyond  using  simple  OLS  estimations,  we  run  a  series  of  estimations  using  instrumental 
variables for three reasons. First, we want to ensure that variation in export tax revenues is 
attributable to exogenous conditions in commodity markets or coming from the fact that natural 
endowments limit the kind of commodities a state can produce and export. Second, we want to 
isolate the exogenous variation in prices from possible changes in the tax rates at the state level 
that could drive the variation in export tax revenues per capita. By making sure we are not 
including the variation in taxes, we make sure that our results are not a product of political 
economy factors driving export tax rates, which could be endogenous to either endowments, 
colonial institutions, or the type of commodities a state exports. In fact, from the scant data on 
export taxes we have we know that most states had similar tax rates for the same commodity 
(the differentials were minimum according to costs of transportation). Third, we think there is a 
possibility of serial correlation in our estimates,  since it is  likely that export tax revenue at 
period t-1 is correlated with the error term at period t. For example, a permanent change in 
conditions (e.g., in preferences or competitiveness)  in the international market for the main 
commodity export of state i could increase export tax revenue and, consequently, expenditures 
on public goods in t-1, which could persist through the error term in t, thereby driving up 
expenditures on public goods in period t.  10 
 
Seeing how taxes on commodity exports account for much of state revenues, we wanted 
to find an exogenous factor that determined the export and revenue collection capacity of each 
state  (without  affecting  expenditures  on  public  goods  directly).  Initially  we  thought  of 
geographical or climate-related variables that explained the supply of exports across states (i.e., 
why some states specialized in some and not other commodities).  
Yet we ran into two obstacles. First we did not have panel data for weather variables. In 
fact,  weather  and  temperature  varied  widely  within  states.    Second,  creating  a  panel  with 
climatic  variables  (such  as  rainfall,  temperatures,  and  barometric  pressure),  geographical 
variables (such as altitude and distance to the equator), and other geological variables (such as 
soil types, which determine which crops can be produced) would have enabled us to control for 
conditions that affected the supply of, but not demand for, commodities.  
Because  the  shock  we  want  to  capture  has  an  important  demand  component,  and 
weather  data  was  largely  unavailable  for  the  period  1891-1930,  we  devise  an  alternative 
approach. First we rely on the fact that the geographic and weather data that we do have shows 
a strong correlation with the export or crop mix of each state (i.e., the export mix of each state 
reflects  the  specific  geographic  and  weather  conditions  of  the  state).  Therefore,  we  use  the 
export mix in 1901 (the first year for which we have complete fiscal data for all states) to create 
export price indices per state. Having the export mix of each state we then proceed to use the 
annual variation in the prices of the largest exports to capture shot-term fluctuations in demand 
and supply and create simulated export price indices for every state (leaving the weights fixed 
according to the export mix in 1901). We use fixed weights because we want the export mix to 
be as exogenous as possible to expenditures on education (in any case the results do not change 
much if we use the export basket in each year to weight prices). 
We combine the information on commodity exports at the state level in the initial year 
with the variation in prices and create export price indices for every state. We take the eight 
most important commodity exports and use their shares in 1901 to weight the price index. 3  We 
                                                 
3 The first year for which there are data for commodity exports at the state level is 1901. There 
being no evidence of compositional changes in the state exports during the 1890s, we believe that 1901 
should be representative of the state of commodity exports in 1890. 11 
 
use  world  market  prices  for  commodities,  either  from  Global  Financial  Data  or  from  the 
database of Jacks, O’Rourke, and Williamson (2009).  
We then use a price index for each state as an instrument for state public revenue per 
capita in the first stage, the idea being that our price indices per state will reflect how much 
states can extract in ad valorem taxes on exports. In the second stage, we use our estimated state 
public revenues per capita as independent variable to estimate the expenditures on education 
per capita. 
Using  price  indices  of  commodity  exports,  however,  assumes  that  states  did  not 
influence the growth rate of prices in international markets, which is not necessarily true. This is 
problematic  because  São  Paulo,  Minas  Gerais,  and  Rio  de  Janeiro,  as  price  setters  in  the 
international  coffee  market,  largely  determined  the  growth  rate  of  national  coffee  exports 
(especially in 1906-1914, and in some years in the 1920s). Also, Amazonas and Pará were the 
principal suppliers in the international rubber market, but there was no coordination or any 
explicit effort to control prices; rubber exporters were price takers. To deal with the potential 
endogeneity  in  coffee  prices,  we  construct  alternative  price  indexes  that  ignore  the  price 
fluctuations for coffee and we then do the same excluding rubber prices. The results do not 
change too much when we exclude coffee or rubber from the price indices or when we remove 
from the sample the states that obtained most of their revenue per capita by exporting coffee 
(e.g. São Paulo) and rubber (Amazonas). 
IV.  Findings 
Our OLS estimates show that increases in export tax revenues are significant to explain the 
increases in expenditures on education at the state level (see Table 5) and that the effect of an 
increase of 1% in export tax revenues is an increase in education expenditures of 0.12%-0.27% 
once we control for imports, population density and fixed effects. That means that large jumps 
in export tax revenues per capita over time, for instance jumps of 100% in states that exported 
rubber or coffee, education expenditures per capita could be increased almost 20%. Even when 
we  control  for  the  composition  of  the  export  basket  we  find  that  the  coefficient  for  export 
revenues per capita is still significant and of similar magnitude. That means that it was not 
changes  in  the  composition  of  exports  that  determined  the  increase  in  revenues  and 




In specifications 7 through 12 of Table 5 we run OLS specifications that include state-specific 
time trends, in addition to the fixed effects and the time dummies for all states. We then find 
that export tax revenue is still significant in some of the specifications and explain increases in 
education expenditures, even if only at 10% significance. In specification 9 we have to take out 
the  data  for  the  state  of  Minas  Gerais  because  we  do  not  have  data  on  its  imports  and  in 
specification 5 and 6 (as well as in 11 and 12) we take out states that exported coffee (Rio de 
Janeiro and São Paulo) and rubber (Amazonas and Pará), respectively. Across the board our 
coefficient for the logarithm of export tax revenue is weakened, with the elasticity going to 0.12. 
That means that the true effect may be at the lower bound of the OLS estimate without state-
specific trends.  
Another way to approach the same concern is to run a simple OLS using the average of 
the  variables  of  interest.  Interestingly,  the  coefficient  of  export  tax  revenue  per  capita  is  of 
similar magnitude to those we found using panel estimates with time trends.  
 
Instrumental Variables 
In order to show that the variation in export tax revenues is exogenous to the political economy 
of the state (e.g., to changes in tax rates), and to correct for possible serial correlation, we run the 
same estimates using our export price indices for each state as instrumental variables (IVs). The 
results of our IV estimates are in Table 6. The variation in export prices at the state level seems 
to explain the variation in expenditures on education over time quite strongly. Again even after 
controlling for the composition of the portfolio (the average) we find strong coefficients in the 
first and second stages. This perhaps implies that what mattered the most to increase revenues 
and expenditures were the price ramp ups. In this table we also run estimates that exclude the 
price of coffee and rubber and show that the results are not driven by Brazil’s market power in 
these two products as the coefficients do not change radically. 
The coefficients for the variable of interest (export tax revenues) in the second stage are 
larger than our OLS panel coefficient, but close to one standard error larger so we believe there 
is no significant bias or measurement error driving our IV results. One could think that the 13 
 
coefficients could be biased upwards because the prices of commodities affect expenditures 
through  other  channels  than  just  export  tax  revenues  (e.g.,  commodity  prices  could  have 
pushed land prices up and thus increased the collection of land taxes and expenditures on 
education), that is, there could be a possible violation of the exclusion restriction. However, in 
Table  6  we  have  controlled  for  the  other  tax  revenues,  which  include  land  taxes,  a  tax  on 
industries and professions, and other stamp taxes in order to study the pure effect of export tax 
revenues on education expenditures. Even after controlling for these alternative channels we 
still find a strong effect of our simulated price indices on education expenditures. Moreover, 
when we control for the crop mix of the state the alternative tax revenue channels have no 
significant effects, while our instrumented export tax revenues is still significant. Thus, we think 
the evidence shows that the effect of commodity prices on expenditures through other revenues 
is not a major problem and that there is no violation of the exclusion restriction. 
 
Explaining Education Indicators Using a Reduced Form 
Going beyond just expenditures on education, what we really care about is whether the increase 
in export tax revenue per capita or the price of exports can help us explain the improvements in 
education indicators over time. In order to check this we take two approaches. First, we average 
out all of our variables and run a simple cross-sectional regression (with limited sample size of 
20) and check if average expenditures on schooling per capita are correlated with the change in 
literacy rates (1890-1940), the number of schools (1890-1940), and the number of students (1890-
1940). We find significant correlations across the board, except for the change in the number of 
students, which is only significant when we control for state characteristics (See Table 7A). We 
then run similar regressions using panel data (Table 7B) and using our simulated export price 
indices at the state level as  independent variable, rather than using export tax revenue per 
capita. We get consistent significant coefficients except for the specification in which we control 
for population. 
In sum, our empirical strategy shows that state governments collected more tax revenue 
when they had increases in the prices of their commodities. Those states that had higher export 
tax revenues ended up spending more on education and having better outcomes such as higher 
literacy and enrollment rates or more schools. Yet, we have not explained why the political 14 
 
elites who controlled the government in the different states of Brazil would have incentives to 
use the ―windfall‖ profits of exports to pay for education for all. In the next section we examine 
the incentives of these elites. 
 
Colonial institutions and education expenditures between 1889 and 1930 
In  order  to  explore  whether  initial  conditions  may  be  determining  why  states  spend  on 
education when they receive an additional dollar in revenue we run the same OLS regressions 
(with panel data) we presented in the previous section, but this time we add interaction terms 
that multiply export tax revenue per capita by each of our variables that are proxies colonial 
institutions (see Table 8). The interactive variables we use are the percentage of slaves to total 
population  by  state  in  1872  (Engerman  and  Sokoloff,  1997),  the  native  population  before 
colonization (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Bruhn and Gallego, 2007)  the average 
size  of  a  farm  in  1920,  as  a  proxy  for  land  concentration  (Engerman  and  Sokoloff,  2002; 
Engerman,  Mariscal  and  Sokoloff,  2009),  and  a  dummy  for  good  (coded  as  1)  and  bad  (0) 
colonial institutions depending on whether the main commodity the state produced during 
colonial times either relied on plantation agriculture or on some form of coerced labor (we 
follow  the  classification  of  commodities  of  Bruhn  and  Gallego,  2007,  see  Panel  C  of  the 
Appendix).  
For simplicity, we call the set of all of these variables ―colonial institutions,‖ even if not 
all these initial conditions come from colonial times (e.g., our data on land concentration). This 
is  because  the  argument  of  the  literature  on  colonial  institutions  is  that  inequality  in  the 
distribution of economic assets and political power was broadly determined during colonial 
times and then persisted over time (Acemoglu et al, 2001; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002).4 
                                                 
4  We  actually  think  that  for  some  variables  there  is  relative  persistence.  For  instance,  the 
correlation of the number of slaves by state in 1864, the first year for which we have data and 1887, the 
last year before emancipation, is 0.8, even though there was significant migration from the sugar regions 
in the northeast to the coffee areas of the southeast of Brazil. Yet, we are not sure about the persistence in 
land holding patterns. Wegenast (2009) assumes that land concentration was stable since colonial times 
and even uses the Gini coefficient for land concentration in 1950 as ―exogenous‖ source of variation to 
explain  expenditures  on  education  in  the  twentieth  century.    In  contrast,  Engerman  and  Sokoloff 
(forthcoming)  explain  that  land  laws  and  land  ownership  had  more  changes  over  time  than  other 
institutions.  15 
 
Our  econometric  estimates  show  that  these  proxies  for  colonial  institutions  are  not 
significant when interacted with export tax revenues per capita. This is probably because export 
tax  revenues  are,  as  we  mentioned  earlier,  already  determined  by  endowments.    The  only 
coefficient that deserves a separate explanation is that of the good/bad commodity dummy 
interaction  in  specification  3.  This  coefficient  is  positive  and  significant  and  our  variable  of 
interest (export tax revenues) alone loses significance. This is because the states that ended up 
producing  the  profitable  commodities  (e.g.,  rubber  and  coffee)  during  our  period,  where, 
coincidentally, states that did not have plantation agriculture during colonial times. In fact, they 
were  provinces  with  low  population  densities.    In  contrast,  the  states  that  produced  sugar, 
tobacco,  and  cotton  during  our  period  were  states  that  had  a  large  slave  population  and 
produced sugar and tobacco in large plantations. 
Thus,  one  may  think  that  a  large  part  of  the  effect  of  colonial  institutions  or  how 
entrenched imperial elites were in each state may be captured by the fixed effect of the OLS 
regressions. In fact, most of the fixed effects were negative and in some states, such as Bahia and 
Pernambuco, they were also large. We believe these large negative fixed effects may be related 
to  how  entrenched  imperial  elites  were  in  those  states.  A  good  example  is  the  state  of 
Pernambuco, with one of the largest negative fixed effects, where ―ex-monarchists dominated 
state politics,‖ and where ―not a single historical Republican was elected governor‖ (Love, 1980, 
p. 112). In fact, Pernambuco started with one of the highest literacy rates within Brazil (in 1889) 
and then fell to the bottom of the rankings by 1930 because of lack of investment in education 
(see Table 1). On average Pernambuco devoted 7.1% of expenditures to education during the 
Republic, making it the state with the second lowest share of expenditure going to education. 
Pernambuco also had one of the lowest per capita expenditures on education, far below the 
mean for Brazil (see Table 3). 
V.  Demand vs. Supply in the Provision of Education 
In this section we examine the motivation of state politicians and state political parties to spend 
money on education. Understanding the incentives that politicians had to spend on education 
in Brazil between 1889 and 1930 is particularly important because their behavior is puzzling 
when  seen  under  the  light  of  the  literature  that  studies  political  institutions  and  education 
expenditures. In a country with such steep inequality and in which the Constitution included a 16 
 
literacy requirement to vote we would expect elites to limit the provision of education to the 
elites (Engerman, Mariscal and Sokoloff, 2009; Lindert, 2004). In fact, before 1889 most of the 
expenditures on education went to a limited number of schools and there were subsidies for 
certain private schools that educated mostly the children of the imperial elites.  
Following, Lindert (2003, 2004) one would expect that in states that had a larger number 
of  voters  to  total  population—his  measure  of  political  voice—there  should  be  higher 
expenditures on education per children. A simple scatter plot showing average expenditures 
per capita and the change in the number of voters from 1875 to 1930 across Brazilian states 
shows that  the  dynamic  that  Lindert  suggested  may  have been  at  work  in  Brazil since  the 
change in the number of voters is highly correlated with the level of expenditures. We also find 
that there is a significant and positive correlation between the increase in the number of voters 
to total population and education expenditures per capita at the state level (Table 9). 
There are many reasons why we would expect to find an increase in the demand for 
education over time, in particular as the number of voters increased. For instance, as Brazil 
industrialized,  industrialists  could  have  pressured  governments  to  provide  more  education. 
Alternatively,  families  themselves  could  have  demanded  more  education  as  skill  premia 
increased (i.e., the difference in salary between skilled and unskilled workers), or simply as a 
product  of  the  fact  that  families  were  richer  and  could  afford  to  send  their  kids  to  school. 
Finally, the rapid increase in European immigration after 1890 could have been another cause of 
the increase in demand, either because planters in Brazil pushed local governments to offer 
better  public  education  to  attract  migrants  or  simply  because  as  the  migrants  arrived  they 
demanded public schools. 
We test for some of these hypotheses to see if there is clear demand push for education. 
We,  however,  find  no  consistent  evidence  that  industrialization,  or  immigration  drove  the 
increase  in  education  expenditures  at  the  state  level.    Since  there  is  not  panel  data  for 
industrialization or immigration by state, we use data from the population census (1890, 1920, 
1940) and industrial census (1907, 1920, and 1940) and interact the data with our variable of 
interest, export tax revenue per capita, in order to use the full potential of our panel. We find 
significant coefficients but with negative signs when we interact the latter variable with either 
growth in industrial production between 1907 and 1940, the number of industrial firms or the 17 
 
value of industrial production in 1907, 1920, and 1940. The same happens when we interact 
export tax revenue per capita with the number of immigrants in 1890 or 1920 (Table 10) 
There  are  two  reasons  why  we  feel  confident  about  our  puzzling  results  that 
immigration  and  industrialization  are  not  correlated  with  increased  in  expenditures  on 
education at the state level. First, a great majority of the European immigrants to Brazil came 
from countries where governments did not spend much on education, such as Italy, Portugal 
and Spain (Lindert, 2004), so there is no reason to expect them to demand education in Brazil. 
Second, the industrialization of Brazil was not with technology that had skill-complementarity.  
For instance, following Goldin and Katz (1998), we divide the industries for which we have data 
on technology imports between those that are the product of the first industrial revolution (i.e., 
textile and machinery for woodwork), which require low levels of education, and a second 
generation of technology, product of the second industrial revolution (i.e., machinery for energy 
and  electric  equipment)  that  relies  on  a  more  skilled  labor  force.  We  find  that  the  largest 
increase in machinery imports took place in sectors  linked to the first industrial revolution, 
which were labor-intensive and required less skilled workers.  
Still,  even  if  the  link  between  industrialization  or  immigration  and  education 
expenditures  is  weak,  we  cannot  falsify  the  hypothesis  that  changes  in  income  or  societal 
preferences increased the demand for education. Nevertheless, what we can do is documenting 
some of the dynamics in the supply side just to show that there is stronger statistical evidence to 
back some of the supply-side dynamics. 
In our view, the correlation between voters and expenditures on education in Table 9 
has an endogeneity problem. Since there was a literacy restriction to vote, the number of voters 
is endogenous to expenditures on education. In states where expenditures on education were 
used to teach children (and adults) how to read and write, there was an increase in the number 
of voters. This problem is particularly clear in our case because we are working with education 
data that comes from census years that were spaced far apart, thus blurring the causality line 
between the increase in voters and improvements in education. It is hard to get away from this 
problem of reverse causality as it is hard to think about an instrument that could explain the 
increase in the number of voters that does not affect directly expenditures per capita or is not 18 
 
highly correlated with expenditures or education outcomes. Thus, in the case of Brazil it is hard 
to defend the causality from voters to expenditures only (Lindert, 2003,2004).  
Instead, we think that our simulated price indices can be used as an instrument for 
expenditures on education per capita (a reduced form of our IV regressions) and that if we find 
they are correlated with the number of voters, there could be evidence that the causality runs 
from expenditures to voters. This is because most of the expenditures of state governments 
came from export tax revenues, thus expenditures on education per capita can be instrumented 
using the exogenous variation in exports per state given by price movements.  States with better 
terms of trade could have attracted immigrants who could be potential voters, say because of 
their higher literacy rates. This dynamic, however, was not that strong as there was minimal 
internal migration in Brazil as transportation costs were too expensive and because about half of 
the  European  immigrants  who  went  to  Brazil  were  illiterate  and  not  all  of  the  literate 
immigrants naturalized to become voters. 
In our previous estimations, we find that the variations in price movements are highly 
correlated with expenditures on education (Table 6), with the change in education outcomes 
(Table 7), and education expenditures are correlated with the increase in the number of voters 
per state (Table 9). That is, it is easy to defend statistically the supply story than the demand 
story of voters demanding more expenditure. 
The last issue is just to provide an explanation of why state politicians would want to 
invest in education if there was a literacy requirement preventing the masses from demanding 
such public services. In our view, it is precisely because there was a literacy requirement to vote 
that state politicians had incentives to provide basic elementary education not only to meet the 
demands of voters for public goods, but as a way to increase their capacity to mobilize voters 
for national elections. In order to increase the number of voters the state dominant parties could 
mobilize, politicians needed to increase the number of literate adult males. This had to be done 
by teaching the ―desired‖ group of voters the basics of how to read and write.  
These  incentives  for  politicians  came  into  place  when  the  Republican  movement 
overthrew the imperial government in 1889. Since 1881, adult males who wished to become 
registered voters had to be able to write their name and the date when they registered.  This law 
also kept the income requirement that prevailed in Brazil since the early nineteenth century, 19 
 
increasing the minimum annual income required to vote from 100 mil reis (about US$43) to 200 
mil reis (US$85), the equivalent of an annual salary for most blue collar jobs.5 Then, between 
1889 and 1890, two Republican decrees eliminated the income requirement to vote and changed 
the electoral system, from one with electoral colleges at the state level, to a system with direct 
elections for president and federal congressmen. Thus, the government made every vote in any 
part of the country be worth the same in national elections. In order to compete for political 
power, either to win the presidency of the country, or to win favors from the ruling coalition, 
state political parties had to compete against one another by increasing the number of votes 
they could mobilize in their states in national elections.  
In general, state parties had to bargain with  the ruling coalition  at the federal level, 
integrated by the Republican parties of the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais.6  That was the 
case in the 1890s and by 1902  President Manuel Ferraz de Campos Sales forged an agreement 
with governors and state parties through which, in exchange for support for the ruling coalition 
in national congress and for votes in the presidential elections, state politicians got favors. The 
kind of favors a state politician asked for in such a decentralized federation ranged from no 
military intervention from the federal government, the deployment of l ess federal soldiers in 
their states, and subsidies to build railways or ports, to congressional support to block state 
opposition parties. 
According to this agreement  between the ruling coalition at the federal level and 
Republican (or pro-Republican) parties at the state level , the latter could appeal to the president 
and its ruling coalition in Congress for help if an opposition party at the state level threatened 
their hold of power. This is because contested elections for governors or federal senators  and 
congressmen had to be scrutinized by national congress.  Therefore, the dominant block in 
Congress could help a state party to annul the election of an opposition candidate on some 
technical ground.  This practice was commonly referred to as ―beheading‖7. 
                                                 
5 See the so-called Saraiva Law, Decree 3029 of 1881. 
6 Except for the 1910 to 1914 presidential period, when the ruling coalition had the Republican 
Party of Minas Gerais that of Rio Grande do Sul, leaving the Republican Party of São Paulo outside of the 
circle of power. For a basic overview of power relations among states see Fausto (1999: 265-267). 
7 See Porto (2002), p. 196 and Fausto (1999) pp. 258-259 or the vote count in the Diario do Congresso 
on June 27, 1902. 20 
 
It is hard to think that state politicians had a long enough horizon to invest in educating 
children so that they could vote in future elections. Yet, dominant political families ruled for 10 
or 15 years in power in some states, while in others the dominant parties ruled for decades (de 
Souza, 1984). Also, most states had a dominant state republican party that had the incentive to 
invest in increasing the number of voters it could mobilize in the future, both in order to keep or 
increase its bargaining power vis a vis the dominant parties controlling the presidency or as a 
way of hedging against the rise of an opposition party in their own state.  
Now, the objective function of politicians at the state level was not just to maximize the 
number of voters, otherwise one could argue that they could have simply done away with the 
literacy requirement, ignoring the writing test at the time of registering voters.  But political 
elites did not want to increase the number of voters in a way that threatened their tenure in 
office. Thus, we think that the literacy test was a way to ―filter‖ who could vote and the policy 
variable  used  to  increase  the  franchise  was  the  increase  in  literacy,  either  in  elementary 
education or in night schools. Doing away with electoral institutions, such as the process to 
register voters, was not an option. The political system was oligarchic, but had some checks and 
balances in operation. Massive electoral fraud or manipulation of the registration process was 
monitored and punished by parties in national congress. Electoral conflicts and anomalies led to 
significant conflict in congress, military tensions between state governments and the federal 
government, and even a civil war in 1930. 
As a way to minimize political opposition at the state level parties and politicians made 
investments to improve education only at the margin; only enough to make people pass the 
literacy test to vote, but not enough to increase the franchise and education in a way that would 
risk their control of the state.  This is because the  potential risk of  enfranchising too many 
people or marginalized sectors of the population could end up leading to an overthrow of the 
dominant party and of the status quo in the state. For instance, the Brazilian ruling white elite 
may have wanted to keep former slaves (emancipated in 1888) at bay as much as possible. 
Therefore,  we  should  not  expect  to  find  that  education  expenditures  before  1930 
increased  dramatically  the  educational  attainment  of  the  population  and,  especially  not  for 
black  Brazilians.    One  way  to  examine  these  two  hypotheses  is  to  look  at  the  education 
accomplishments of two cohorts, those who were 6-10 years old in 1920 and those who were of 21 
 
the same age in 1930, using Brazilian census data compiled by IPUMS.  In Table 11 we show 
that there were significant improvements in literacy in this cohort compared to the initial level 
of literacy in our period, going from a literacy rate of less than 20% of the population in 1890 to 
over 50% for these cohorts. Yet, this improvement in basic skills to read and write did not 
translate into a radical improvement in academic attainment for all. For instance, there is a 
significant  difference  in  the  educational  attainment  of  blacks  and  mixed  race  Brazilians 
compared to whites, with literacy rates of around 30 percent or less for the former and around 
60 percent for the latter. The percentage of people who never attended school is closer to 80% in 
the black and mixed race group, versus 50% for whites.  
VI.  Conclusion: Implications in the Long Run 
In this paper we have shown that there was  some progress in the provision of elementary 
education in Brazil between 1889 and 1930 and that it was to a large extent a consequence of the 
fact that some states got export tax revenues to spend on public education. We are cautious, 
however, because for the period we examined we could not infer anything on the quality of 
education.  We  acknowledge  the  fact  that  increases  in  the  quantity  of  education  do  not 
necessarily translate into increases in the accumulation of human capital. Still, given the starting 
level of educational attainment in Brazil, the expansion in the supply of education in our period 
was significant. 
We think that our findings are original and surprising for a broad literature that studies 
the political economy of education for three reasons. First, the fact that there can be trade shocks 
that alter the development trajectory of a state in a significant way, despite the legacy of colonial 
institutions,  is  important.  Few  of  the  works  that  defend  the  persistent  effect  of  colonial 
institutions  discuss  in  depth  the  kind  of  shocks  that  actually  can  change  the  development 
trajectory of a country or in this case, a state. We argue that initial conditions (or the so-called 
colonial  institutions)  were  strong  constraints  to  increase  education  expenditures  after  states 
received windfall profits from taxing exports, but at the end of the day our econometric work 
shows that windfall tax revenues had a net positive effect on education expenditures.  
Moreover, we show that shocks to the terms of trade can have long-lasting consequences 
on the distribution of wealth and human capital across states.  For instance, the ranking of 
Brazilian  states  according  to  literacy  rates  has  not  changed  much  since  1930,  but  is  very 22 
 
different from that of the late nineteenth century (e.g., 1872).  This is partly because after 1930 
both industrialization and internal migration patterns perpetuated the relative inequality across 
states and even accentuated it as capital and labor flowed to the states that were more educated 
at the turn of the century. Therefore, our paper suggests one explanation of the origin of high 
regional inequality in Brazil. 
Second, the advances that we describe in the provision of public education happened 
despite  the  fact  that  there  was  a  literacy  requirement  to  vote.  This  may  be  puzzling  when 
compared to the findings of  Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002) or Lindert (2004), who find 
that in countries with literacy requirements the ruling elite spends less on education that in 
countries without such restrictions. Naidu (2010) also finds similar results at the county level for 
the Post-Bellum South in the United States. Yet we show that competition in national elections 
in Brazil (to mobilize more voters for presidential election) and the literacy requirement may 
have provided the right incentives for state political parties and state politicians to spend on 
education. We think some of the divergent results are due to the fact that the cross-country 
literature has an implicit model with one elite, with coherent and unified preferences, which 
controls politics and rations the supply of education. In the case of Brazil (1889-1930) we find 
that there were a multitude of state and federal elites competing and bargaining with each 
other. Dominant elites at the state level were rationing education, but not to prevent as many 
people as possible from voting, but as a way to maximize their hold of power. This sometimes 
implied increasing the provision of education. Recent research on Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China  finds  that  in  large  countries  with  relatively  autonomous  provinces  the  rationing  of 
education  varies  according  to  the  heterogeneity  of  elite  interests  across  subnational  units 
(Chaudhary, Musacchio, Nafziger, and Yan, 2010). 
Third, the fact that the expansion in the provision of education was financed by taxing 
commodity exports is surprising because there is a long discussion among social scientists on 
whether there is a so-called ―resource curse‖ (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Lederman and Maloney, 
2007).  A broad definition of the resource curse, beyond the fact that countries with abundant 
natural resources tend to have slower growth, would argue that countries that have abundant 
natural resources develop renter mentalities that can prevent them from investing in productive 
capacity in the long run (e.g., leading them to have low investment in education).  Our findings 23 
 
support the idea that there is no resource curse, but that positive trade shocks can be converted 
into  long-term  development  if  there  is  electoral  competition  and  economic  assets  are  not 
concentrated in a few hands.  
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Literacy Rate  X  X  X    X    X   
1872, 1890, 1900 and 1920 from 
Brazil (1923); 1940 from Brazil 
(1950) 
Population, total, age brackets and 
national/foreigners 
X  X  X    X    X   
1872, 1890, 1900 and 1920 from 
Brazil (1923); 1940 from Brazil 
(1950) 
Number of Primary Schools  X      X  X  X  X  Both 
For 1872, from Brazil (1917a); 
1907 from (1917b); 1920 from 
Brazil (1923); 1933 from Brazil 
(1936) and 1940 from Brazil 
(1946) 
Enrollment in Primary Schools 
(TOTAL) 
X      X  X  X  X  Both 
For  1872 from Brazil (1940); 1907 
from (1917b); 1920 from Brazil 
(1923); 1933 from Brazil (1936) 
and 1940 from Brazil (1946) 
Primary Schools Teachers  
     
X    X  X  Both 
1907 from (1917b); 1920 from 
Brazil (1923); 1933 from Brazil 
(1936) and 1940 from Brazil 
(1946) 
Teachers who attended a  school 
of education ("Normal" Teachers)            
X  X 
  Brazil (1946)  
Graduation ("Conclusao") 
     
X    X  X  Both 
1907 from (1917b); 1920 from 
Brazil (1923); 1933 from Brazil 
(1936) and 1940 from Brazil 
(1946) 
 
Panel B. Fiscal and Trade Data  
Variable  Source: 
Education Expenditure and Export Tax Revenue8 
Willeman (1909) and Brazil (1926), data for the 1880s from 
Brazil (1887) 
State Public Revenue9 
For data before 1897, we use Brazil (1914). For data from 1897 
to 1939, see AEB V (1939/40).  
Commodity prices   Global Financial Data  and Jacks et al (2009). 
Stock of Debt 
Wileman (1909) has unbalanced data until 1908. For 1912 we 
take the information from Brazil (1917a). For 1922, we take the 
information from Brazil (1926) and finally for 1930 the source 
is Bouças (1932). We have also added data compiled for São 
Paulo from Love (1980). We extrapolated between these data 
                                                 
8  We only have state expenditures in schooling for the periods: 1901-1907, 1914-1916, 1919-1921 and 1924-1926. 
Expenditures come from the state budgets and may differ from the actual amounts spent. 
9  The data is the budgeted and not the ―actual‖ amounts spent. The data sources we have reported budgets for either 6 or 
18 months, thus we had to annualize the amounts multiplying by 2 or 2/3 respectively. Finally, we completed some missing data 
using simple linear interpolation between the closest data points available. 26 
 
points in a way that allowed us to run a panel. 
Exports and Imports 
Data from 1902 (imports) and 1901 and 1902 (exports) from 
Brazil (1904); 1908-1912 comes from Brazil (1917a); Data from 
1913-1927 and 1935-40 comes from Commerico Exterior do 
Brasil, several years.; Information from 1928-1934 is from 
Brazil (1938); Data for  1887, 1892 to 1897 and 1903-1907 is from 
Brazil  (1908). Except for Minas Gerais10 and the Federal 
District (Distrito Federal).11 Data for Minas Gerais from Minas 
Gerais (1929) 
 
   
                                                 
10  We have information only for states that had customs offices and a port (or a navigable river that connected it to the 
ocean). For this reason, we originally had no data for Góias (GO) and Minas Gerais (MG). Yet for Minas Gerais we have some 
reports of total exports, but not from which port they were shipped. Since we know that most of the exports were shipped from Rio 
de Janeiro (RJ), Santos (in São Paulo, SP), and in the 1920s through Espírito Santo (ES). For simplicity we assume that the exports of 
MG were exported through RJ and SP in equal proportions. Thus we subtract the exports from MG from those two other states.  For 
the MG export data for 1927-1931, we assume that the MG average export share between 1923 and 1927 will prevail for the rest of 
the studied period and we proceed with the same methodology as explained above. In order to show that results of the estimations 
do not change, we also use the exports as reported by the federal publications (excluding MG). Unfortunately, data for imports for 
MG are not available. Therefore, all the estimations that include imports as a control exclude the observations from MG. 
11 The city of Rio de Janeiro was the capital of Brazil, known as Federal District (Distrito Federal or DF). Rio de Janeiro 
City is in the middle of what was Rio de Janeiro State, now Guanabara. Both the city and the state collected their own tax revenue, 
yet export taxes collected in the port of Rio de Janeiro accrued mostly to the State of Rio, while import taxes accrued to the Federal 
Government, as in other parts of the country. Moreover, the port of Rio de Janeiro, in the Federal District, served the states of Rio de 
Janeiro and Minas Gerais. Rio de Janeiro state had no other port until the 1920s (i.e. Angra dos Reis). Therefore, we cannot 
distinguish the exports made from the capital itself and Rio de Janeiro State (or Minas Gerais, see note above). We are confident, 
however, that most of the exports shipped from the Rio de Janeiro port were commodities produced in the state of Rio de Janeiro 
and not in the Federal District. Furthermore, we consider that the state of Rio de Janeiro benefited from the exports and economic 
activity of the port of the city of Rio de Janeiro and vice versa and for this reason we use the same level of international trade 






Panel C. Data sources for variables that measure institutions, industrialization, and electoral participation  
Variable  Definition  Source: 
Capital invested  Total social capital in industrial companies  1920 Census  
Dummy Good 
Commodity 
If the state grew a ―good‖ commodity is 1; otherwise 0. Good 
commodities include cacao, cattle, and cotton; bad commodities include 
the trade of enslaved Indians, mining, and sugar. We use Bruhn and 
Gallego’s coding, but add Ceará as cotton and Piauí as sugar. Thus we 
code states as follows: AL=Sugar, AM=Cacao; BA=Sugar; CE=Cotton; 
ES=Sugar; GO=Mining; MA=Cotton; MG=Mining; MT=Cattle; 
PA=Cacao; PB=Sugar; PE=Sugar; PI=Sugar; PR=Mining; RJ=Sugar; 
RN=Cattle; RS=Cattle; SC=Cattle; SE=Sugar; SP=Indians. 
Bruhn and Gallego (2007) 
Industrial Production 
and Number of 
Industrial 
Establishments; and 
Wage Premium  
Industrial production in 1920 milreís and number of industrial 
establishments. 
Skill premium for 1940 is defined as the ratio of the average 
administrative wage to the average worker wage in 1940. 
Skill premium for 1920 is defined as the average wage of the food 
industry to the average wage of textile industry, as the former has more 
administrative workers than the latter. 
1907, 1920 and  1940 
Industrial Census 
Mortality Rates 
We use three different measures. The first one is an overall measure of 
mortality per 1,000 people from the population census of 1920 and 1940 
(Brazil, 1923, 1950). The second is a measure of mortality from tropical 
diseases, which include yellow fever, ―intermittent fever,‖ Malaria or 
paludism, and Typhoid fever. The third measure also includes all sorts of 
gastrointestinal diseases, especially Cholera and Dysentheria. The latter 
two mortality rates are estimated over 1000 inhabitants and are for 1910.  Brazil (1913) 
Population Density 
Population/km2  For population see Panel A; 




Population per squared km at the time of colonization 
Bruhn and Gallego (2007)  
Size of Rural 
Establishments in 1920  
Average number of hectares per rural establishment in 1920. 
1920 Industrial Census   
Slave Share in 1872  Percentage of the population that was slave in 1872  1872 Population Census 
Voters in 1875, 1910 
and 1934 
Before 1891 the number of voters represents the number of registered 
voters, between 1891 and 1934 we have the data for the number of 
registered voters (eleitores) and we only have the number of actual votes 
for the 1910 election. 






















Table 1.  Ranking of States by Literacy Rates In the Long Run 
  Panel A. Ranking of States by Literacy Rates 














States that moved up the ranking over time 
        SP  18.8  10  16.6  10  52.1  2  95.4  3 
SC  16.5  11  23.3  3  49.1  3  95.6  2 
GO  16.2  12  12.6  16  22.8  16  91.2  8 
AM  14.1  15  19.0  6  36.6  9  92.0  6 
ES  13.1  17  16.0  13  39.8  8  91.5  7 
MG  11.2  20  12.2  17  33.0  10  91.1  9 
RJ  19.1  9  17.8  8  42.5  5  95.7  1 
States that did not move significantly from their ranking in 1872a 
    PR  28.9  1  22.5  4  42.9  4  93.4  5 
RS  22.5  3  30.3  1  54.4  1  95.0  4 
SE  13.4  16  11.6  19  27.2  11  83.2  12 
CE  13.0  18  16.3  11  26.2  13  80.8  15 
PB  12.9  19  14.9  15  20.8  18  76.5  18 
States that moved down the ranking over 
time 
        PA  26.7  2  26.0  2  41.1  6  88.3  11 
MA  22.1  4  15.4  14  21.2  17  78.5  17 
MT  20.5  5  19.4  5  40.5  7  89.9  10 
BA  20.3  6  10.1  20  23.7  15  81.5  13 
PE  19.6  7  16.8  9  25.1  14  81.5  14 
RN  19.1  8  18.3  7  27.1  12  80.4  16 
PI  15.0  13  11.8  18  19.0  20  76.5  19 
AL  14.3  14  16.2  12  19.5  19  74.8  20 
 
Panel B Correlation of Literacy Rates by Stateb 
             1872  1890  1900  1920  1940  1950  1970  1980  1991 
1890  0.8215*  1 
              1900  0.6735*  0.8666*  1 
            1920  0.7432*  0.9107*  0.9256*  1 
          1940  0.6555*  0.8372*  0.8631*  0.9731*  1 
        1950  0.6070*  0.7888*  0.8055*  0.9427*  0.9895*  1 
      1970  0.3969  0.5539*  0.6529*  0.7840*  0.8719*  0.9127*  1 
    1980  0.3914  0.5381  0.6447*  0.7718*  0.8592*  0.8984*  0.9922*  1 
  1991  0.3545  0.4844  0.6069*  0.7382*  0.8301*  0.8732*  0.9792*  0.9925*  1 
2007  0.3295  0.4735  0.6504*  0.7384*  0.8218*  0.8550*  0.9684*  0.9801*  0.9839* 
Notes:a) This group shows states that did not move more than five places in the overall ranking 
between 1872 and 2007. b) These correlations include all states except the Federal District. Stars (*) 




Table 2. Expenditures in Schooling, Literacy Rate ,  Enrollment and Schools  



































Alagoas  Sugar  0.5  209  560  6,928  32,913  5.4  13.2  1.62  2.25 
Amazonas  Rubber  3.2  122  926  3,546  24,100  10.0  23.2  3.43  8.90 
Bahia  Tobacco  0.4  671  1,624  22,131  86,876  4.4  9.2  1.34  1.72 
Ceará  Cattle  0.7  237  861  9,497  62,035  4.2  13.0  1.04  1.80 
Espírito Santo  Coffee  1.0  280  801  18,698  166,644  7.2  25.2  2.93  4.40 
Distrito Federal 
   
105  784  2,582  44,783  19.0  56.1  2.84  2.70 
Goiás 
 
0.2  95  391  2,708  22,956  4.4  12.1  1.56  2.06 
Maranhão  Cotton  0.5  170  636  6,545  34,117  5.7  12.2  1.49  2.28 
Minas Gerais  Coffee  0.8  1,757  3,628  46,997  396,769  5.7  23.4  2.15  2.14 
Mato Grosso  Rubber  1.8  51  302  1,830  20,888  7.9  22.8  2.20  3.30 
Pará  Rubber  2.0  336  999  11,904  65,745  13.5  27.9  3.80  4.23 
Paraíba  Cotton  0.5  92  710  2,531  51,317  2.0  16.0  0.74  2.22 
Pernambuco  Sugar  0.5  747  1,902  19,742  98,204  7.5  15.7  2.85  3.04 
Piauí  Cotton  0.2  84  181  2,129  15,999  2.9  8.0  1.14  0.91 
Paraná  Mate  1.4  213  1,037  6,968  69,140  10.2  25.2  3.11  3.78 
Rio de Janeiro  Coffee  1.0  852  1,531  31,091  129,543  14.4  29.1  3.95  3.44 
Rio Grande do Norte  Cotton  0.5  159  430  5,443  34,847  7.7  20.6  2.26  2.55 
Rio Grande do Sul  Cattle  1.5  499  4,313  24,287  249,895  9.8  33.2  2.01  5.73 
Santa Catarina  Mate  0.8  174  1,733  7,508  100,861  10.0  37.3  2.31  6.41 
Sergipe  Sugar  0.9  206  448  3,750  22,291  4.9  17.4  2.69  3.49 
São Paulo  Coffee  3.6  1,098  4,910  21,989  488,646  6.3  31.6  3.15  3.18 







Table 3. State Expenditures on Education Per Capita Before and During the Republic, 1875-1925 





























Alagoas  Sugar  0.5  19%  0.5  13%  -3% 
Amazonas  Rubber  1.8  12%  3.2  9%  80% 
Bahia  Tobacco  0.5  15%  0.4  6%  -15% 
Ceará  Cattle  0.4  23%  0.7  19%  76% 
Espírito Santo  Coffee  1.2  22%  1.0  9%  -14% 
Goiás 
 
0.4  21%  0.2  8%  -37% 
Maranhão  Cotton  0.9  32%  0.5  10%  -46% 
Mato Grosso  Rubber  0.9  23%  1.7  12%  76% 
Minas Gerais  Coffee  0.4  28%  2.4  15%  448% 
Pará  Rubber  2.4  25%  2.1  11%  -13% 
Paraíba  Cotton  0.4  18%  0.5  12%  31% 
Paraná  Mate  0.9  20%  1.4  14%  54% 
Pernambuco  Sugar  1.0  20%  0.5  7%  -46% 
Piauí  Cotton  0.3  16%  0.2  9%  -14% 
Rio de Janeiro  Coffee  1.6  19%  1.2  11%  -24% 
Rio Grande do Norte  Cotton  0.5  27%  0.5  9%  -2% 
Rio Grande do Sul  Cattle  1.1  19%  1.8  15%  67% 
Santa Catarina  Mate  0.6  27%  0.8  13%  30% 
São Paulo  Coffee  0.7  14%  3.6  16%  441% 
Sergipe  Sugar  0.7  19%  0.9  14%  24% 







Table 4. Pupils by teacher and type of primary schools (% of enrollment) , 1907-1940 
   Pupils by teacher    
Pupils by teacher in 
state schools    
Schools 1940 
   1907  1933  1940     1907  1933  1940     State  Local  Private  Federal 
Acre 
   
29.3 
   
35.3  29.2 
 
34.4  58.3  7.3  0.0 
Alagoas  36.7  44.4  41.7 
 
42.1  49.4  41.2 
 
52.0  21.9  26.1  0.0 
Amazonas  16.2  20.2  36.8 
 
16.3  19.2  38.3 
 
74.3  10.7  15.0  0.0 
Bahia  30.1  32.9  51.6 
 
44.8  37.7  58.3 
 
82.8  4.9  12.1  0.1 
Ceará  30.6  42.1  35.7 
 
38.7  46.2  37.0 
 
66.8  22.1  11.0  0.0 
Distrito Federal  22.5  33.6  37.0 
         
0.0  57.9  41.2  0.8 
Espírito Santo  30.7  41.2  41.6 
 
34.6  43.3  43.1 
 
84.7  9.5  5.8  0.0 
Goiás  28.3  36.7  35.3 
 
27.9  41.6  46.6 
 
49.4  31.5  18.3  0.8 
Maranhão  38.2  37.0  42.2 
 
44.7  39.5  44.8 
 
32.5  46.7  20.8  0.0 
Minas Gerais  39.0  40.1  37.1 
 
59.1  40.6  35.7 
 
55.1  37.6  7.3  0.0 
Mato Grosso  27.3  33.6  39.2 
 
42.9  34.1  38.6 
 
64.2  10.7  25.1  0.0 
Pará  27.4  42.1  52.6 
 
34.4  45.1  52.6 
 
81.4  0.0  18.6  0.0 
Paraíba  32.7  51.1  47.3 
 
45.6  57.8  52.5 
 
70.0  0.0  30.0  0.0 
Pernambuco  30.8  40.2  39.0 
 
44.7  42.4  40.6 
 
25.6  39.8  34.6  0.0 
Piauí  32.3  40.9  48.8 
 
45.1  45.8  53.5 
 
75.7  9.2  15.2  0.0 
Paraná  33.3  35.9  33.6 
 
40.5  37.0  33.3 
 
82.4  6.6  11.0  0.0 
Rio de Janeiro  31.0  45.8  48.3 
 
47.1  45.0  47.2 
 
60.0  28.2  11.8  0.0 
Rio Grande do Norte  40.1  54.2  49.3 
 
48.7  56.7  51.2 
 
66.5  8.5  24.8  0.2 
Rio Grande do Sul  36.8  38.1  37.7 
 
49.6  41.0  34.4 
 
31.5  23.2  44.0  1.3 
Santa Catarina  33.2  42.9  44.5 
 
42.6  49.7  45.5 
 
59.8  32.5  7.7  0.0 
Sergipe  27.1  38.8  39.4 
 
32.5  41.0  43.2 
 
76.5  9.1  14.4  0.0 
São Paulo  27.4  37.3  42.9 
 
31.7  39.2  44.0 
 
57.4  17.8  24.8  0.0 
TOTAL  31.0  38.6  40.8     42.2  40.9  42.3     57.1  22.7  20.0  0.2 
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Table 5. Expenditure on education per capita at State Level. 1901-1926. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the state governments expenditure per capita in education. 
Regressions test the hypothesis that revenues per capita derived by exports explain the capacity of the states to provide education. A positive coefficient on export tax revenue 
per capita support  our hypothesis that states with endowments that yielded higher export revenues were able to spend more on education. Specifications 7 through 12 
include state-specific trends, and 13 and 14 regional specific trends. Variables are in logarithms, so the coefficient is an elasticity.  Robust state cluster standard errors shown in 
parenthesis. Coefficients marked with: *** indicates significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%  
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
   Fixed effects  and year dummies  Fixed effects, year dummies, and state-specific trends  Region-specific 
   L(Education)  L(Education)  L(Education) 
  










     
L(Exports Revenue)  0.637***  0.345***  0.271***  0.270***  0.274***  0.151**  0.434***  0.182*  0.142*  0.131*  0.155*  0.119*  0.154**  0.422*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.057)  (0.115) 
L(Import)       0.239***  0.144*  0.180*  0.057      0.121***  0.075  0.125  0.053  0.070  0.084 
 
     (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.06)      (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.054)  (0.093) 
L(Population Density)       0.166  0.256  0.285  0.043              0.662  0.048 
 
     (0.10)  (0.27)  (0.29)  (0.29)              (0.715)  (0.104) 
Sugar Share         -0.321**  -0.372***  -0.255*        -0.219  -0.222  -0.198  -0.369***  -0.307 
 
       (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.12)        (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.118)  (0.187) 
Coffee Share         -0.32  -0.774  -0.308        0.223  1.403  0.208  -0.297  0.328 
 
       (0.29)  (1.10)  (0.31)        (0.19)  (1.44)  (0.19)  (0.320)  (0.872) 
Cotton Share         0.084  -0.001  0.165        0.034  -0.007  0.059  0.042  -0.367* 
 
       (0.17)  (0.18)  (0.17)        (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.136)  (0.199) 
Rubber Share         0.839***  0.770**  0.820**        -0.071  0.126  0.762  0.624*  -0.543 
 
       (0.27)  (0.34)  (0.30)        (0.59)  (0.63)  (0.66)  (0.341)  (0.477) 
Cocoa Share         -3.600***  -3.253***  -4.450***        -2.684*  -2.235**  -3.404***  -3.335***  -2.772*** 
 
       (0.86)  (0.73)  (0.92)        (1.30)  (0.95)  (0.99)  (0.907)  (0.477) 
Tobacco Share         0.376  0.115  0.278        -0.047  -0.136  -0.071  0.204  0.210 
 
       (0.86)  (1.09)  (0.76)        (0.77)  (0.88)  (0.70)  (0.799)  (0.510) 
Mate Share         0.271  0.221  0.2        0.1  -0.026  0.176  -0.071  -0.262 
 
       (0.53)  (0.60)  (0.55)        (0.23)  (0.26)  (0.21)  (0.533)  (0.284) 
Constant  -3.424***  -4.770***  -5.834***  -5.870***  -5.696***  -6.085***  -4.462***  -6.015***  -6.112***  -6.130***  -6.022***  -6.205***  -4.664**  -4.510*** 
 
(0.56)  (0.63)  (0.53)  (0.73)  (0.79)  (0.78)  (0.446)  (0.588)  (0.403)  (0.446)  (0.609)  (0.412)  (2.079)  (1.005) 
Export commodity mix  N  N  N  Y   Y   Y   N  N  N  Y   Y   Y   Y   Y  
State fixed effects  N  Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   N  Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   N 
Year dummies  N  Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   N  Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y  
State-specific trends  N  N  N  N  N  N  Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   N  N 
Region-specific trends   N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  Y   Y  
Observations  287  287  257  257  215  230  287  287  257  257  215  230  257  215 
R-squared  0.535  0.875  0.885  0.899  0.893  0.898  0.841  0.922  0.930  0.934  0.931  0.930  0.899  0.893 





Table 6. Regressions for Expenditure on Education. Panel A reports the second 
stage estimates with expenditures on education at state level, and Panel B the first 
stage using commodity international prices index as instrument. Panel C reports 
OLS  estimates  already  reported  in  Table  5.  Variables  are  in  logarithms,  so  the 
coefficient  is  an  elasticity.    Robust  state  cluster  standard  errors  shown  in 
parenthesis. Coefficients marked with: *** indicates significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * 
at 10%  










   Panel A: 2 SLS. L( Education Expenditure) 
L(Export Tax Revenue)  0.735***  0.537***  0.453***  0.354***  0.529***  0.313** 
  (0.119)  (0.121)  (0.114)  (0.120)  (0.167)  (0.099) 
L(SPRpc - ETRpc)  0.312***  0.188**  0.150**  0.12   0.146**  0.115* 
  (0.103)  (0.064)  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.069)  (0.062) 
Observations  272  272  257  257  257  257 
R2 Adjusted  0.59   0.87   0.88   0.90   0.88   0.90  
                 Panel B: First Stage for Export Tax Revenue per capita  
              L(Commodity Prices)  -0.428***  0.610**  0.609**  0.559**  0.544**  0.597** 
   (0.119)  (0.277)  (0.238)  (0.251)  (0.208)  (0.237) 
R2 Adjusted  0.224   0.73   0.789  0.83   0.83   0.84  
F statistic  7.8   183.2   133.6   9.7   26.4   24.8  
Kleibergen-Papp Stat.  9.8   4.8   6.5   5.0   6.8   6.3  
             
   Panel C: OLS 
L(Export Tax Revenue)  0.637***  0.345***  0.271***  0.270***  0.270***  0.270*** 
   (0.097)  (0.100)  (0.079)  (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.074) 
             
   Panel D: OLS with Instrument (Simulated Prices)  
L(State Public Revenue)  0.604***  0.315***  0.247***  0.259***  0.259***  0.259*** 
  (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.080)  (0.079)  (0.079)  (0.079) 
L(Commodity Prices)  0.036  0.165**  0.134*  0.068  0.068  0.068 
   (0.058)  (0.073)  (0.071)  (0.075)  (0.075)  (0.075) 
              State and Year Dummies  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Pop. Density & Imports  N  N  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Commodity Share  N  N  N  Y  Y  Y 





Table 7.A. Correlations between Expenditures and Education Outcomes (Cross Section).   Robust errors  in parenthesis. Coefficients 

























Coefficient Avg. expenditure pc education  6.412***  0.815  0.041*  Y 
      Coefficient Avg. expenditure pc education  6.608***  1.011***  0.032 
 
Y 
    Coefficient Avg. expenditure pc education  6.627***  1.011***  0.032 
 
Y  Y 
  Coefficient Avg. expenditure pc education  7.179***  1.540***  0.029     Y  Y  Y 
                Table  7.B.  Reduced  Form  Estimate.  Effects  of  Commodity  Prices  on  Education  Outcomes.    Dependent  variables  are  education 
outcomes.  The  independent  variable  of  interest  is  logarithm  of  our  state  price  indices  for  three  periods.  Panel  data  using  three 
education census years: 1890, 1900, 1920. In this reduced form We test the hypothesis that favorable fluctuations in the international 
price of commodities increased the expenditure on schooling, which was reflected in higher education outcomes .  The expected sign of 
the coefficient is positive.  Coefficients marked with: *** indicates significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. Errors clustered at the state level. 
  
L(Literacy 








Coefficient of L(simulated Prices)  0.207**  0.647***  0.329***  Y 
      Coefficient of L(simulated Prices)  0.340***  0.576***  0.340*** 
 
Y 
    Coefficient of L(simulated Prices)  0.278***  0.214**  0.272*** 
 
Y  Y 
  Coefficient of L(simulated Prices)  -0.068  -0.104  -0.073        Y  Y 
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Table 8. Public Goods Expenditures per capita at State Level and Colonial Institutions. 1901-
1926. In this table we replicate our OLS estimates and add an interaction term of export tax 
revenue with the share of slaves in 1872, population density at the time of  colonization, the 
average size of rural establishments in 1920, and a dummy for good commodities that follows 
Bruhn  and  Gallego  (2007).  These  interactions  try  to  measure  how  important  were  colonial 
institutions  as  initial  conditions  to  explain  the  pattern  in  public  expenditure.  Robust  cluster 
standard errors shown in parenthesis. Coefficients marked with: *** indicates significant at 1%, ** 
at 5% and * at 10%. Standard errors clustered at the state level.  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Education pc  Education pc  Education pc  Education pc 
Export Tax Revenue pc 
0.04970**  0.06449***  0.01672  0.07033 
(0.02062)  (0.01135)  (0.01722)  (0.16387) 
Exports Revenue pc*Slave share in 
1872 
0.24157       
(0.38649)       
Exports Revenue pc*Native 
population pre colonial 
  -0.00164     
  (0.01015)     
Export Revenue pc*Dummy Good 
Commodity 
    0.04745**   
    (0.01987)   
Exports Revenue pc*Average Size 
of Rural Establishment in 1920 
      -0.00699 
      (0.16574) 
State fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Imports pc, pop. density  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  257  257  257  257 
R2  0.918  0.915  0.916  0.915 
R2 Adj.  0.901  0.898  0.899  0.898 
Note. The average and standard deviation (in parenthesis)  for each institutional variable is as 
follows: slave share in 1872=0.05(0.07);  precolonial native population ( inhabitants per km2)= 3.1 
(2.6); dummy for “good commodity” during colonial times= 0.45(0.51), and average size of rural 
establishment in 1920(has)= 630(1246) 
 







Table 9. Voters growth and Education Expenditure 
   (1)  (2) 






L( Education pc)  0.411*  0.409** 
  (0.193)  (0.152) 
Voters 1875/ literate male 1872  -1.373***   
  (0.320)   
Voters 1894/ literate male 1890    -0.948* 
    (0.484) 
Constant  Y  Y 
Macro controls  Y  Y 
Dummy for outlier (Amazonas)  Y  Y 
Literacy Rate 1890  Y  Y 
Observations  20  17 
r2_a  0.697  0.550 
R-squared  0.761  0.663 
F  11.95  5.889 










Table 10. Education Expenditures per capita at State Level. 1901-1926. The dependent variable is the state expenditure per capita in schooling. Regressions look at 
the effects of interaction terms between export tax revenue per capita and immigration and industrialization indicators from different census. All the interacted 
variables were normalized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.  Monetary variables are in 1913 reis.  Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis (clustered at the 
state level). Coefficients marked with: *** indicates significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%  
   Dependent Variable: Expenditure on Education per capita 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
































ETR pc  0.106***  0.069***  0.033**  0.054***  0.053***  0.052***  0.056***  0.054***  0.057***  0.060*** 
ETR pc interacted with (see 
columns): 
-0.070**  -0.047  -0.111**  -0.020***  -0.019**  -0.039*  -0.021***  -0.020**  -0.021***  -0.024*** 
Pop. density & imports  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State and year dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Constant  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  257  262  262  262  262  262  262  262  262  262 











Table 11. Actual Education Outcomes Using Census Data from 1960       
  
Age of cohort in 
1910 (1960) 
Age of cohort in 
1920 (1960) 
Age of cohort in 
1930 (1960) 
   6-10 (56-60)  6-10 (46-50)  6-10 (36-40) 
Literacy rate (%)  44.8  51.5  56.2 
Whites  55.3  62.0  67.0 
Blacks  21.7  27.6  33.1 
Mixed race  26.8  33.5  37.7 
Completed elementary education (% of cohort)  2.5  3.2  3.5 
Whites  3.6  4.5  5.1 
Blacks  0.2  0.4  0.5 
Mixed race  0.5  0.6  0.9 
Completed up to fourth grade  10.3  11.8  13.2 
Whites  14.1  15.7  17.3 
Blacks  3.3  4.2  5.8 
Mixed race  3.3  4.6  5.5 
Never attended school (% cohort)  59.9  53.1  48.1 
Whites  49.8  42.6  37.3 
Blacks  81.4  75.7  70.2 
Mixed race  77.2  71.1  66.5 
 